# Patch Notes #006: Money in Politics / Corruption Evidence Matrix

Version: v0.1 public pre-memo matrix
Date: 2026-07-03
Status: Source-anchor matrix for reviewer critique. This is not a final evidence review.

## Working Standard

Every claim must name the mechanism: contributions, independent expenditures, dark money, lobbying, revolving doors, procurement, gifts, stock trading, enforcement weakness, agency capture, or information asymmetry. "Money corrupts politics" is a public feeling, not a policy-ready claim.

| Claim | Evidence Strength | Initial Source Anchor | Reviewer Ask |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Campaign money, lobbying, procurement, and revolving doors are distinct influence channels with different legal rules and reform tools. | Strong as institutional description | FEC, lobbying disclosures, ethics rules, procurement data | Where does public explanation blur mechanisms? |
| Disclosure is uneven; some political money is transparent, some delayed, and some routed through entities that obscure original funders. | Strong directionally; details depend on vehicle | FEC, OpenSecrets, Brennan Center, IRS nonprofit rules | Which disclosure gaps matter most? |
| Constitutional doctrine limits some campaign-finance reforms, especially spending restrictions. | Strong; doctrine evolving | Citizens United, McCutcheon, FEC v. Ted Cruz, recent cases | Which reforms are plausible? |
| Lobbying can represent legitimate petitioning and expertise while also creating access, dependency, and capture risks. | Synthesis; needs examples | House/Senate lobbying disclosures, political science literature | What does influence look like in practice? |
| Small-donor/public-financing systems may change candidate incentives, but design matters and effects vary. | Moderate; jurisdiction-specific | NYC/state evaluations, Brennan Center, academic studies | What evidence generalizes? |
| Revolving-door restrictions can reduce conflicts but may affect expertise, hiring, and enforcement capacity. | Moderate; needs stronger pass | ethics rules, watchdog reports, academic literature | Which cooling-off rules work? |
| Procurement and contractor influence may matter as much as campaign finance for some policy areas. | Hypothesis; needs issue-specific evidence | USAspending, state procurement data, inspector general reports | Where does capture appear in implementation? |
| Stock trading and financial conflicts can undermine trust even where legal. | Moderate; evidence varies | STOCK Act data, ethics disclosures, watchdog reports | What rules are enforceable? |
| Reform should target incentive channels while preserving speech, association, petitioning, and competitive elections. | Synthesis hypothesis | legal review plus reform evidence | Where is the balance wrong? |

## Research Gaps Before Memo v0.2

1. Current campaign spending, outside spending, party spending, and donor concentration.
2. Lobbying spend by industry and issue area.
3. Dark-money definitions and measurable limits.
4. State/local examples of public financing, disclosure, lobbying, ethics, procurement, and enforcement.
5. Revolving-door and conflict-of-interest enforcement evidence.
6. Procurement capture and contractor influence case studies.
7. Legal viability of reform menu under current Supreme Court doctrine.
8. Measures of public trust, access, responsiveness, and policy distortion.